I. Introduction
The scarcity of norms about administration or administrative law in constitutions is sometimes deplored at national level. Indeed, constitutional texts are often silent or extremely brief as far as administrative law is concerned. Among the better known texts, the French Constitution of 1958 is perhaps the most copious, but there is few beyond the classic statement that government "dispose de l'administration" (Article 20 (2)) -only some rules on nomination, territorial entities, the ombudsman and budgetary audits. 1 In Germany with its great administrative tradition -just to mention Prussia and Max Weber -, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) has a chapter on administration (Articles 83 to 91), but it is only on the distribution of administrative competences between the federation (Bund) and the States (Länder). 2 In the United States of America, most constitutional requirements for administrative law are drawn from Article II Section 2 (2) -appointment -and Section 3 -faithful execution of the laws, which leaves open many controversial questions of administrative law. 3 In the United Kingdom, which -as we all know -does not have a written constitution, unwritten constitutional rules on administrative law are not abundant, to say the least. 4 All in all, would it not be help-ful to have clear constitutional indications on the organisation and activity of the administration to determine such issues as the establishment of new agencies, the scope of administrative rulemaking or the legitimacy of administrative action rather than addressing these issues by complicated interpretive operations of constitutional or administrative lawyers?
In the end of the day, this is up to national administrative legal systems. At the level beyond the State, however, the topic appears to be more important. Given the doctrine of conferral -an international or supranational entity cannot dispose of more powers than conveyed to it by the Member States -which is enshrined in Article 5 (1) Treaty on European Union (TEU) for the European Union, 5 there is without doubt a need to describe administrative powers more precisely. It may therefore be quite astonishing that until 2009, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 6 , the administrative powers of the EU were even hardly mentioned, and the said treaty did not introduce a particular chapter. There is a series of norms in the Treaties on administrative issues which will be explained in the third part of this short paper:
Articles 17 TEU, Articles 197, 291 (1) and 298 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ChFREU 7 ) (see below III.), but before doing so, two constitutional preliminaries have to be addressed.
II. Constitutional Preliminaries

Does the EU have a constitution?
First, it may be disputed whether we can really consider the legal order of the European Union as constitutional. This dispute, however, appears to be settled by now in a way that on the one hand, the divergent positions are clear and that on the other hand, there is consensus Looking at EU administrative law, however, we have to bear in mind the supranational character of the EU. The need to formulate constitutional foundations is higher due to the particular legal nature of an entity that depends on a conferral of powers in the Treaties.
Although we can discern a common European rule of law, laid down in general principles formulated by the ECJ over years, the idea of concretising constitutional aims and values at the level of administrative law is appealing for the sake of legal clarity and normative precision.
III. Constitutional Issues of EU Administrative Law
The Complexity of Federalism: The European Composite Administration
The first constitutional issue of EU administrative law is related to the obvious fact that government in the EU must be considered as some form of combination of the Member
States' administration together with administration at supranational level. The entity to be administered is obviously not a State, but a union of States, and in terms of administrative law, the concept of the 'European Administrative Space' is a metaphorical expression that is quite common and useful to describe this situation and at the same time avoid the intrusion of constitutional complexities into the debate in administrative law. 21 The starting point of analysis is certainly not a constitutional one. Some authors argue that it is only about rulemaking, not on any administrative activity including adjudication. 24 They can base their argument on the position of that article within the Treaties. It is not placed in a passage on administration -which does not exist -but in the section on rulemaking ("The legal acts of the Union"). However, it appears to be more convincing to apply the article to the whole range of administrative activity. 25 The wording hints at such openness -"all measures … necessary" is not only abstract or general rules. Further, the section on legal acts also encloses decisions of the EU institutions (cf. Article 288 (4)
TFEU. When interpreted in such a broad sense, section (1) of Article 291 must be read in the following way: When implementation of EU law is necessary, it is first and foremost up to the Member States to do this; implementing powers of the EU institutions have to be drawn from other provisions of the Treaties. Matthias Ruffert S. 7
The real problem lies elsewhere. The normative emphasis on the Member States' power of implementation is in conflict with administrative reality in the European administrative space.
For a long time, co-operative structures have been developed in that space. 26 Several types of such structures can be discerned, in particular in various fields of product licensing. 27 The model of transnational State licensing is most common: A product is licensed in one Member
State to be marketed in the whole Union. Co-operation is reduced to mutual trust, which is an institutionally low level, but a high one in substantive terms, as it requires common standards and the legitimate expectation in their overall sound implementation. Consequently, the first constitutional basis of EU administrative law is that the administrative implementation of EU law is a primary responsibility of the Member States but to be con- sidered as a matter of common interest, which implies that the supra-national level is to be involved if necessary.
The Plurality of Supranationalism: The Administration of the EU
The starting point for analysing the administration of the EU as such is easier to be dis- The unitary picture of supra-national administration is subject to profound changes in recent years. Internal problems of accountability led to the sourcing out of a range of tasks, usually with considerable budgets to be distributed such as in the field of research of education, to (now) six executive agencies. 34 However, these executive agencies lack independence in many respects so that their action can be attributed to the Commission. This is completely different for the so-called regulatory agencies. These agencies are conceived to be independent. They are vested with diverse administrative tasks to be performed in an independent way. Over the years, this 'agencification' led to a significant pluralisation of the EU administration. 35 In the beginning, it was a pluralisation in quantity. The number of new agencies was high (it is now 34), but their powers were rather limited, in most instances to the collection of statistical data or other information and on giving advice following the data col- 45 It is however somehow deplorable that the ECJ never considered that the principle of democracy, now well enshrined in Article 10 (1) and (2) Matthias Ruffert S. 12 cal choice. 48 All in all, it is by no means settled that the polycentric construction of legitimacy that develops at EU level 49 will find general acceptance in all Member States.
It is one thing to develop constitutional guidelines given the scarcity of explicit provisions, but it is another to apply existing constitutional rules to the new, agencified structures. The ECJ was faced with this issue when it had to decide whether agencies could be involved into delegated rulemaking. It should be noted that the preparation of binding delegated legislation or the issuance of soft law is well known and that the legal soundness of these phenomena are at least not called into question with respect to specific norms in the Treaties. However, in the ESMA case, 50 it occurred that an agency was empowered to emit binding rules, to be precise:
ESMA was enabled to prohibit short selling in the stock market. The Court -upon an action for annulment brought by the UK -used two arguments to back its rather generous approach.
First, It used two lines of argument. First it denied that delegated and implementation powers under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU were exclusively held by the Commission. 51 Although there was no explicit conferral of such powers to a Union body, office or agency, the Treaty presupposed the possibility of such conferral in its Articles 263, 265, 267 and 277 which contained judicial review mechanisms that applied "to the bodies, offices and agencies established by the EU legislature which were given powers to adopt measures that are legally binding on natural or legal persons in specific areas". 52 Second, the Court placed an emphasis on the need for rapid intervention in financial markets and for a high degree of professional expertise on the part of the authorities involved. 53 Obviously, this is rather weak. Methodically, it is highly questionable to infer a power to This is not to say that rulemaking by agencies was inacceptable per se, as it should not be asserted here that the polycentric structure of the EU administration could be anything but illegitimate. The argument is that the more constitutional provisions on administrative matters are thin and sparse, the more academic effort is needed to provide a sound basis for EU administrative law.
The Individual and Government: A Europe of Citizens
The whole search for constitutional content in EU administrative law might appear futile if
we consider that administrative law should be above all about the limitation of power to the benefit of the individual. At least, this is the first limb of the ratio of administrative law, the second -which was dealt with in the sections above -being enabling administration to exert between the protection of human rights and the protection of the individual in administrative law; there is a great overlap of both fields. What we have to consider, though, is that some of the principles developed are genuinely administrative legal ones, and they continue to be applied next to the guarantees of the Charter: certainty, non-retroactivity, proportionality.
Some of those administrative law rights have found explicit recognition in Article 41 of the Charter, the Right to good administration: the right to impartial, fair and reasonably quick treatment, the right to be heard, the right of access to ones file, the right to be given reasons, the right to damages in case of a breach of law and -very important since the very beginning of European administration 59 -the right to be heard in any language of the Treaties. This very article is not exempt from critique. Some argue that such minimal rights were insufficient, others criticise the scope of the article which only applies to EU institutions' activities while other parts of the Charter are also applied to Member States' action quite extensively. 60 Although any such criticism must be taken seriously, it should be noted and underlined that in 
IV. Consequences for Comparative Research
What consequences should be drawn from this picture in administrative law research which extends beyond parochial developments and takes a cross-border, if not global perspective? Three final points shall be submitted here for discussion.
First, the various linkages between constitutional and administrative law that can be discerned in the EU reflect the political character of administrative law. Although doctrine more than once has made us believe that administrative law was purely technical and somehow apolitical, it is not. Institution building, rulemaking, the attribution of powers in a federal entity, the position of citizens in relation to government -these are all highly political issues.
The political impact becomes apparent in many fields of EU administrative law where the quest for deepening and broadening European integration shapes administrative law more than any theoretical or doctrinal approach in administrative law properly speaking. This is most visible in the rapid building of the Banking Union with a plethora of administrative instruments, many of them vested in the European Central Bank which is was certainly not designed to take such a core role in the field of supervision and resolution. 62 Another instance of this topic is less spectacular, but more settled in its continuity: In the field of research policy, the EU has always been building new institutions and shaping new instruments of action, which sometimes matured into Treaty provisions over the years and sometimes did not. 63 To sum up: administrative law may be the concretisation of constitutional law, but at the same time administrative form follows political function.
Second, the political situation of the European Union as a supranational entity is certainly influenced by many peculiarities with respect to administrative law. However, it is most likely that there are similar developments in other jurisdictions. Also elsewhere, administrative law can be assumed to be coined by political developments. There are many comparative efforts 
